0:06

Hi everyone and welcome back to the Leading

0:08

in a Crisis podcast . We're happy to

0:10

have you with us today . On this

0:12

podcast , we share stories from the front

0:14

lines of crisis management through interviews

0:17

, storytelling and lessons learned

0:19

shared by experienced crisis leaders

0:21

. I'm Tom Mueller With

0:24

me today . My co-host again , Marc Mullen

0:26

. Marc , welcome .

0:28

Greetings , Tom , looking forward to our time together

0:30

today .

0:32

Today we are venturing to England

0:34

to talk with a highly experienced

0:36

crisis leader , Amanda Coleman

0:38

. Amanda fits right in on

0:40

this podcast as she is a crisis

0:42

communication specialist , just

0:44

like Mark and myself . Amanda

0:47

is also a published author , with two

0:49

books to her credit on

0:51

communications and crisis

0:53

communications , and today

0:56

she runs her own consultancy , Amanda

0:58

Coleman Consultancy Limited

1:00

, which is based in England . Amanda

1:03

started her career as a journalist

1:05

before joining the Greater Manchester

1:07

Police as a public information

1:10

officer , and it's the

1:12

context of that role with Greater

1:14

Manchester Police that we're going to talk to

1:16

Amanda today . Amanda

1:18

, welcome to the show .

1:21

Thank you for inviting me . I'm looking forward to

1:23

it .

1:24

Hey , we appreciate you taking the time and

1:26

I know we're going to have a great conversation

1:29

Now for our listeners . I

1:31

want to take you back to 2017

1:34

. Ariana Grande had

1:36

just concluded a concert

1:38

at the Manchester Arena in England

1:41

a full concert with thousands

1:43

of participants and attendees there

1:46

. Suddenly , as

1:48

the concert was letting out , an

1:50

explosion rocked the arena

1:52

. A suicide bomber had

1:54

detonated a backpack bomb in a

1:56

hallway just as concert goers

1:58

were departing the show and

2:00

the explosion left dozens of

2:02

people dead or seriously

2:04

injured . Amanda

2:07

, she was on duty that night for

2:09

the Greater Manchester Police and

2:11

spent the next several weeks working

2:13

this crisis . Amanda

2:16

, it's hard to put into words

2:19

how crazy

2:21

that night must have been for you , but I wonder if

2:23

you could start off by just walking

2:25

us through those first hours

2:27

of the incident . And where

2:29

were you when you got the call ?

2:47

I actually wasn't on duty when the incident occurred . We had an on-duty press officer who called me probably only 10 minutes after it happened , to

2:49

say that we were aware there's an explosion at the arena and we

2:51

had very limited information at that point and

2:54

we agreed a line that we would put out on

2:56

social media and

2:59

luckily , because we'd done the planning

3:01

work , we were able to do that without

3:03

having to get it proved , because it was just

3:06

some basic information about an

3:08

incident and to keep

3:10

away from the area . I

3:13

did my usual when those sorts of things happened

3:15

went on social media on

3:17

the kind of rolling news and

3:20

there was lots of confusion about what it

3:22

could be at that point and

3:24

there was lots of confusion about what it could be at that point . So I

3:26

suppose at that point I'd done , you know

3:28

, something like 17 years in police

3:30

communication and I just had the feeling that

3:33

it was going to be something

3:35

quite significant . So

3:38

I then got ready to go into work . I was about half ten at night

3:40

and then didn't get

3:42

home until probably

3:45

about one o'clock the next afternoon . As

3:49

we were , I was traveling into work , it was only a short

3:51

drive . We got the update

3:53

about the fact that it was a

3:55

bomb and that people

3:58

had been killed

4:00

. So you got that know

4:02

, we knew that it was then going to be a really

4:05

significant job . We'd

4:07

planned for those things . You

4:09

know that everybody remembers

4:11

that 2017 there'd been incidents

4:14

in london and incidents in europe

4:16

, so we were sort of had

4:18

done some preparation work , only it

4:21

had been for a marauding

4:23

firearms type of terrorist attack

4:25

and not for what we ended

4:27

up experiencing . Um , and

4:30

it's strangely

4:32

, when she said there was so much going on and

4:34

it was very um

4:36

, there was

4:38

just it was kind of frantic , I suppose in one sense in

4:40

terms of so much activity . But

4:43

you kind of slip into a sort of calm

4:46

, of right , we know what we need to do , um

4:48

, and yeah , so , so probably

4:51

the initial moments

4:53

, I was probably at my sort of

4:55

calm , I suppose , um , because

4:57

you slip into kind

5:00

of you know what you need to do and you start

5:02

to do it .

5:03

You sort of slip on the armor of

5:05

crisis and just jump

5:07

in and get working . How

5:11

was it sort of gathering information

5:13

? Because I assume you were located at

5:15

the Manchester Police headquarters , but

5:18

the incident site would have been some

5:20

distance away at the arena . So how was

5:22

, how were you able to gather facts and and

5:24

put together statements ?

5:26

yeah , I mean the good thing is because of the way

5:29

um it kind of works in

5:31

terms of emergency response

5:33

, um , we all , um

5:36

at a strategic level , sit together so

5:38

there was representatives from all kind of the sea

5:40

kind of major organizations involved

5:43

. Um , I went immediately to

5:45

to the police headquarters where that

5:47

control room was was based

5:49

and you are

5:51

getting information relayed back all the time

5:53

so you , you

5:55

know you have the most up-to-date information , um

5:58

, recognizing there's going to be big

6:00

gaps , because with something like that there's

6:02

inevitably going to be huge gaps in information

6:05

as , as you know , more

6:07

details start to cut , to emerge . Um

6:09

, and it also gives you the access

6:12

to senior officers to be able to get things

6:14

approved and information out

6:16

as quickly as possible . And I think that was the biggest

6:18

kind of focus , for for

6:21

us that night was because

6:23

it had happened at half past 10

6:25

at night . You know there's lots of people

6:28

that would be going to bed , getting up

6:30

and suddenly hearing the news and wondering

6:32

where people were and that kind of thing . So you

6:34

know , our focus overnight was really about

6:37

trying to make sure anybody

6:39

who was concerned had somewhere to go , had

6:41

the most up-to-date information and could could

6:43

try and deal with any kind of urgent

6:45

actions that they needed to because

6:49

of the nature of it . But

6:51

yeah , and Really

6:53

I was going to say that the police headquarters

6:56

is probably only about 15 minutes

6:58

drive from the arena . It's

7:00

quite a small . I mean , I

7:02

think this is why Manchester and the

7:04

response was slightly different to other places

7:06

and that it's Manchester

7:08

is quite a small and

7:10

I

7:13

don't know it's very different to London . London

7:15

you get lots of international travellers . You do get international

7:18

people to Manchester , but not in the same

7:20

way . So I think that's why sometimes

7:22

what we did would have been was

7:24

different to what has happened in other

7:27

capital cities , because

7:29

it's much more of a community

7:31

feel , I think , to where we were we

7:39

were .

7:39

Well , we'll talk about the escalation of this here in just a moment , because clearly

7:41

with a terrorist attack you've got a national emergency

7:44

on your hands and you know the whole of government

7:46

would be engaged in responding

7:48

. But at this point you're

7:50

just on this at the control

7:53

center . I wonder can you paint

7:56

us a little picture of what that control

7:58

center activity was

8:00

like ? Are you hearing , you

8:02

know , radio broadcasts coming

8:04

in from the scene ? Is it noisy

8:07

, busy or is it very quiet stage

8:10

?

8:12

It was just I was going to say it was

8:15

, it was busy , but I wouldn't say necessarily

8:17

kind of frantic , noisy . There

8:19

was a small room to the side where

8:21

there would be meetings happening every hour

8:24

and more frequently if needed , so

8:27

you'd be constantly being pulled into different

8:29

meetings . The

8:32

rest of the room is divided

8:34

into different agencies , sort

8:36

of desks , so you would have like

8:38

the transport infrastructure . They would

8:40

be a kind of senior person at a desk . They're

8:42

the same for , um

8:44

, for you know , kind of other

8:47

services and responders , um

8:49

. So there's lots of activity , lots

8:51

of people obviously tactically

8:53

trying to deal with things , um a

8:55

bank of video screens

8:57

which were relaying CCTV

9:00

and any images and things that people could

9:02

get from whatever sources

9:05

we had at that time . And

9:10

one of the challenges I had was that that

9:12

was on one of the floors in the building

9:14

and about three floors lower down was where

9:16

the communications room

9:18

was , where we all were usually based . So

9:21

we had to kind of keep relaying

9:23

information

9:25

upwards and downwards between the floors

9:27

, which sounds dead easy , but actually

9:29

when you're in that sort of environment

9:31

it's much harder , you know , because

9:34

you can't just go . I'm just going to nip

9:36

downstairs and go down in the lift , you

9:38

know , because you can't just go . I'm just going to nip downstairs and go down in the lift

9:40

. By the time you've done that and come back , you've probably lost 20 minutes and you

9:42

haven't got that time . So there was

9:44

lots of kind of um emails

9:46

and messages and quick phone

9:48

calls and um , which , which was

9:50

difficult for me because I felt like I was leaving the small

9:53

team that were dealing with the media inquiries

9:55

and trying to manage what was happening , um , in terms of questions and things

9:57

that were dealing with the media inquiries and trying to manage what was happening

9:59

in terms of questions and things that were being asked . I kind of felt

10:01

like sometimes I left out to leave them because they were

10:03

fronting that as much as they could

10:05

and I was trying to provide the strategic

10:08

kind of lead and information to them . So

10:10

, yeah , so it's always massively

10:12

challenging , I think , with the information flows and

10:16

as the time , not particularly on that night , but

10:18

as things developed , as

10:20

you said , there was national issues

10:22

and local issues

10:24

. So we would have what we call rolling

10:26

logs . That would

10:28

be kind of updated information

10:31

, and there was one

10:33

for government departments , there

10:35

was one for national counter-terrorism

10:38

policing , there was one for general

10:41

policing , because there was a lot of firearms

10:43

officers out and about in the aftermath of

10:45

it , in the days that followed um

10:47

, as well as ones that we would have with other

10:50

um public sector communicators

10:52

. So , very quickly

10:54

, my inbox was

10:57

getting would get clogged all the time , like literally

10:59

all the time , because we were only allowed

11:01

a certain amount of uh of

11:04

space on your email and

11:06

um , and it was incredibly frustrating

11:08

and when I do work now I'm forever

11:10

saying to people it's those little things that

11:13

will make your job a lot harder and

11:15

they seem insignificant when we're

11:17

talking now and like you know , about

11:20

something as serious as that , but

11:22

actually they become a real disabler

11:24

to getting information and to dealing with

11:26

things and to getting decisions made

11:28

into doing things . So , yeah , I think

11:30

we think we have to plan for the big stuff so you can sweat

11:32

the small stuff , and the small stuff is , you

11:35

know , just find an easy

11:37

way of sharing information . That's not

11:39

going to keep being a continued

11:41

problem . Um , as time went on , we ended

11:43

up going back to uh using

11:46

a whiteboard um for lots of things

11:48

, because it was just easier . We were all

11:50

in same sort of location , coming in on

11:52

different shifts , so it was a lot

11:54

easier to then go . That's , that's all the latest

11:57

information on the board over there and

11:59

we'll keep that up to date in

12:01

lieu of , kind , of all the problems with

12:04

email chains . So

12:06

, yeah , it's , but

12:08

the room itself , as I say , busy

12:10

, yeah , and

12:12

just a lot of activity

12:15

between different agencies trying to coordinate

12:17

the response .

12:19

Okay , so you had your communications

12:22

room three floors down from what

12:24

we would call the command center and

12:27

you had information . It sounds

12:29

like you had information coming into your room

12:31

from all over . Was that through emails

12:34

and phone calls , or were people dropping

12:36

in ? Or how were you handling

12:39

the need of the public to know ? Were

12:41

they able to reach directly to you ?

12:45

Your information was coming from just a whole

12:47

whole range of things . There were people coming

12:49

in with updates for from their

12:52

activity and from what they'd done . There

12:54

was in female information that

12:56

was coming in . There was text messages

12:58

, you know , there was . It was literally every channel

13:00

. There was information coming in . Um , I

13:02

think what . What we aimed to do was

13:05

put out as much information as we possibly

13:07

could that we knew was factually accurate . So

13:10

we tried to use social media and and

13:12

the media as time went on , um

13:14

to get as much information out as we possibly

13:16

could to correct any inaccuracies and

13:18

also to deal with the lots of kind of

13:20

overnight because of what happened

13:22

. There was lots of concerns if people had

13:25

seen police activity in an area

13:27

or you know they'd seen a , a bag

13:30

. I remember , um , there was a homeless person

13:32

who , um , there was , there

13:34

was a pile of kind of bags and there

13:36

was . You know that had to . That would became a massive

13:38

issue . So there was . We had to deal with

13:41

all that and try and get a swifter

13:43

response as we possibly could . So there was lots

13:45

of you know . We found this out , check it out

13:47

, make sure we knew the detail and get back

13:49

to you know , get something out about it as quickly

13:51

as possible . A nd the speed

13:54

, I think you know it's

13:57

it just gets . It gets faster

13:59

and faster , doesn't it ? I mean , you've literally got split seconds

14:01

to be able to keep going . Let's check this

14:03

, let's get that , and and that

14:05

was very much kind of just the total focus

14:07

was get as much proactively

14:09

out as we could and deal with all the queries

14:12

that were coming in . I mean , the other really useful

14:14

thing that I always think we kind of forget is that

14:16

all that information coming in in terms

14:18

of questions from the journalists or

14:21

from other sources or from people on social media

14:23

, can be incredibly beneficial and

14:25

useful as part of the operational response , because

14:27

you know you can get details of

14:30

where people are concerned or if there's something happened

14:32

. So I always you know . So it's

14:34

definitely the kind of two-way um

14:36

flow of information , but very

14:39

challenging to manage because you just get

14:41

it through so many different um

14:44

, so many different places .

14:46

How was your how was your approval process

14:49

for getting statements delivered

14:52

and approved and the

14:55

chaos of that , and you have an established

14:57

procedure for that , I would assume

14:59

. Did that change or was

15:01

it more difficult in this environment ?

15:05

Yeah , it was difficult and

15:07

, like we were saying , because of the national interest

15:10

, because of the kind of political interest

15:12

, because of the kind of for there's a

15:14

certain formula , kind of approach that

15:16

has to happen with any terrorist incident . So

15:18

you can't call it a terrorist incident until

15:20

it's got Home Secretary approval , etc . Etc . So

15:23

some of that became a real challenge

15:25

In terms of work we'd

15:27

already done . We had the

15:29

ability to do the initial couple

15:31

of line . You know , we know there's

15:33

an incident without any approval because

15:36

we had that delegated authority . That was really

15:38

important . And then the governance was very

15:40

much through what we call like the gold commander . So

15:42

the person , you know the senior police officer who was

15:44

in charge , um , and because

15:46

we were literally sat virtually , kind

15:48

of you know , a few couple of seats away , you

15:51

can go . Okay , we need to say this now um

15:53

, when we did , we did two media

15:55

statements , um , on camera

15:57

, at about three o'clock in the morning and then seven

15:59

o'clock in the morning , um , and

16:02

those were with the chief constable . So you

16:04

know , pulling those together was

16:06

challenging because we

16:08

had to go . What do we ? What do we want to say

16:10

? What do we need to say ? What are the things that people

16:13

are concerned about , along with

16:15

recognizing that you've got a big

16:17

police investigation that's going to happen and there's certain

16:19

things at some point they're going to want

16:21

to put out around what people seen

16:23

and heard and what information do people have

16:26

. But the balance for us was very

16:28

different , suppose , than we'd even planned for

16:30

. Um , whenever

16:33

we've done any any kind

16:35

of serious incidents , it always

16:37

been what do

16:39

we , what do we need in terms of the investigation

16:41

? And that's what you would primarily be focused

16:43

on . Have you seen this ? Do you

16:45

understand what was leading

16:47

up to the incident With this ? It

16:51

became very much focused on the people

16:53

who were caught up in it . As you mentioned at the start

16:55

, there was 22 people who went to the

16:57

concert and never came home and we we

16:59

knew that , that their families

17:02

would be trying to find

17:04

out about them . Then they would be getting terrible

17:06

news and and and . For us , that became

17:08

the focus of recognizing

17:11

that and recognizing the support that they

17:13

needed and the things that they

17:15

would need to know and the things that their kind of loved

17:17

ones and family and friends and uh

17:20

, would need to know . The police element

17:23

of it kind of took a bit of a secondary position

17:25

, um , and that that stayed with

17:27

us right the way through um and

17:30

became probably one of the biggest

17:32

aspects of the communications response

17:34

.

17:38

Yeah , I just can't imagine

17:40

sort of taking those phone calls from a

17:42

distressed parent , you

17:44

know , looking for a child or

17:46

a spouse or that . So how

17:49

did you guys manage that then ? And

17:52

was that police responsibility to

17:54

sort of set up a hotline for people

17:56

to call in to try and track

17:58

down their loved ones ? Talk us

18:01

through that very delicate piece

18:03

of this operation .

18:05

Yeah , I mean that was a big challenge

18:07

because there is a standard process

18:09

for setting up an

18:12

emergency hotline number and

18:15

the company responsible for doing that , um

18:17

, weren't able to respond quickly enough . So

18:19

there was a massive challenge . They did apologize at

18:22

the public inquiry . They they apologized

18:24

a number of times that they were slow to respond

18:26

. So it ended up being um

18:28

. We had to put a kind of sticking plaster to

18:31

to because we knew we needed to get that number

18:33

out there . So we ended up having a police number

18:35

rather than a specific setup number

18:37

. We had to utilize one of the existing kind of office

18:39

numbers um , with the people who were

18:41

trained to staff um , the

18:44

um casualty bureau

18:46

, as it's kind of termed . And

18:48

then at some

18:50

point which I can't quite remember exactly

18:52

when it was , but it was certainly not overnight and into

18:55

the next day , um , it became a a different number because that process kicked in , but it was certainly not overnight

18:57

. And into the next day , um , it became a different number because

18:59

that process kicked in . But it just shows

19:01

, you know , even with something that's so such

19:04

a core part of any kind of crisis

19:06

response and that happens all the time and there

19:09

is in the crisis . You can't ever rely

19:11

that it will work perfectly , because it didn't

19:13

in this case . And , um , you know we had

19:15

to find a workaround because , as

19:18

you said , that was one of the most critical things and

19:20

it was really difficult for us . We were waiting

19:23

for , you know , it did get the details

19:25

to get the information of who we thought the

19:27

the kind of people who had died

19:30

were . You were seeing people

19:32

being interviewed , um , who

19:34

were , you know , family , who

19:37

were trying to find their loved ones

19:39

, and it's . It is really difficult . There's a

19:41

huge kind of emotional roller

19:43

coaster around it , just as he as a responder

19:46

and and kind of doing the communication

19:48

kind of work . But I suppose

19:50

on one level , it drove us to

19:53

try and do more . So we , we

19:55

did a lot more than than um

19:57

we we'd ever planned to

19:59

in , you know , supporting what the

20:01

family liaison officers who were then appointed to

20:03

work with the bereaved families we had . I

20:06

had a team of kind of three um

20:08

of the public , what you call public information

20:10

officers , three press officers , as we

20:12

call them , who were literally going

20:14

around speaking to all the family

20:16

members to get tributes

20:19

, to work

20:21

out what they wanted

20:23

in terms of you know how they were going to

20:25

handle the media and

20:29

even through to funerals and trying

20:31

to look at how we could manage that . So

20:34

not to tell them what to do do that was never any

20:36

kind of focus but to help

20:38

them navigate so that what

20:41

they needed and what they wanted we

20:43

could try and facilitate and help

20:46

as much as possible . And it became a

20:48

huge piece of work , um

20:50

, but for me I think that was one of the the

20:53

if there's anything

20:55

kind of , you can be kind of look back

20:57

and say , yeah , I was really pleased with

20:59

that bit . I think that bit was what , for

21:01

us , became the

21:04

, the most beneficial element

21:06

of what we did . Um , and

21:08

that was never part of the plan um , that

21:11

was never in the plan um , but it

21:13

, you know . But for me that's where we should

21:15

be all the time really , with these , with

21:17

disasters and emergencies , um

21:19

, that should be where the first thought goes

21:22

to have we supported ? A re

21:24

we there for the people who are really caught

21:26

up in this and then worry

21:28

about some of the other elements around that

21:31

. And the same goes kind of for internal , because

21:33

from the next day so

21:35

that was like overnight , but into the next day . Um

21:38

, obviously we've got a huge amount of people who

21:40

are responding in different ways within

21:42

the , the from the

21:44

police , um service side

21:47

and dealing

21:49

with really difficult things . So you've got that

21:51

whole kind of well-being , welfare , emotional

21:54

support internally as well to

21:56

to to deal with and

21:58

to be able to start to to

22:02

kind of identify and try and put those messages

22:04

out as quickly as possible really , because

22:06

you know , some people struggle

22:08

very quickly and other people

22:11

it can take . Well , one of my

22:13

press officers it took a year really before she

22:15

admitted that she needed to go and

22:17

speak to somebody because of what she dealt

22:19

with during the incident . So

22:22

yeah , I think for me that's the most critical

22:24

part of anything that

22:26

we do really .

22:29

Was that understanding all

22:32

the way up through the command post

22:34

itself ? Or was this where you

22:36

were managing a very human

22:38

process of dealing with victims

22:41

and their families , while the response

22:43

was focused on investigations and

22:46

so on ? Or did you have support

22:48

all the way up to share whatever was needed

22:51

in order to help the

22:53

human process of identifying

22:55

and dealing with the loss ?

22:58

Yeah , it became kind

23:01

of a key element , driver

23:05

of the strategy , um , right up

23:07

to senior level um , that

23:09

we knew we needed to , we needed

23:11

to to help people and do the best

23:13

we could for the people who were affected

23:16

and there was like hundreds really when you look at it , because

23:18

obviously it was the 22 people who

23:20

tragically um died , but then

23:22

there was many , many more that had physical

23:25

and psychological injuries and a lot of them

23:27

were young people as well because of the nature of

23:29

the concert . So so

23:31

there's a natural kind of that that had to be the

23:33

, the kind of driving force for

23:36

everything that said there's a big

23:38

police investigation operation and response

23:40

, but it was always rooted

23:42

in recognizing what had happened

23:44

and not losing sight of the

23:47

emotional distress

23:49

and and , like you say , the , the , all

23:51

the elements that people were having

23:54

to deal with and that were facing um

23:56

and even people who weren't

23:58

necessarily directly connected , because Manchester

24:01

, like I said , is a bit of a community sort of feel , um

24:05

, and you know all my staff lived

24:07

or had been bought and brought and brought up

24:09

in and around the area . You kind of had

24:11

this personal connection

24:14

to it . The arena is one

24:16

of the biggest concert venues . Everybody

24:18

virtually had been to it at some point , so

24:21

there's just so many kind of connectors

24:23

to it , um , and again , in some

24:25

respects that's hard , but others it

24:27

helps really focus you on

24:29

what matters and focus you on

24:31

, you know , just wanting to do the

24:33

best . The challenge for me , I think on a personal

24:36

level , was it took me a lot . I've

24:38

always felt we

24:40

could , and particularly I could have done more , because

24:43

you have that sort of survivor feeling where

24:45

you just think there must have been more we

24:47

could do . There must have been more we could

24:49

do . You

24:53

can't make it go away , you can't make that pain go away for the people who've got that , that

24:55

the terrible kind of trauma to deal with . But you can just

24:57

try and do what you can to help

25:00

in some way . And I think it took me a

25:02

while to really kind of wrestle with that

25:04

um , because it's a difficult

25:06

thing . I think anybody responding in different

25:09

ways experiences , isn't it ?

25:11

Yes .

25:13

And that's going to do it for this episode of the

25:15

Leading in a Crisis podcast . Thanks

25:17

for joining us . If you like what

25:19

you're seeing , then please like and subscribe

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podcast .

26:15

Thank

26:17

you .